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1.	  Introduction	  	  Discovery	  of	  mechanisms	  has	  figured	  prominently	  in	  accounts	  of	  mechanistic	  explanation	  (Bechtel	  &	  Richardson,	  1993/2010;	  Bechtel,	  2006;	  Craver	  &	  Darden,	  2013).	  Much	  of	  the	  discussion	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  experimental	  procedures	  researchers	  use	  to	  delineate	  the	  phenomenon	  to	  be	  explained	  and	  to	  characterize	  the	  parts	  and	  operations	  included	  in	  a	  mechanism.	  Craver	  and	  Darden	  (2013)	  emphasize	  a	  variety	  of	  evidential	  constraints	  (many	  generated	  through	  experiments	  of	  various	  types)	  concerning	  the	  location	  and	  structure	  of	  a	  mechanism's	  components,	  the	  abilities	  of	  the	  components	  and	  the	  activities	  in	  which	  they	  participate,	  temporal	  features	  of	  activities,	  and	  the	  need	  to	  maintain	  productive	  continuity	  between	  activities.	  They	  also	  identify	  a	  variety	  of	  inference	  strategies	  such	  as	  employing	  a	  schema	  type,	  invoking	  an	  analogy,	  or	  forward/backward	  chaining.	  But	  behind	  all	  this,	  there	  is	  a	  further	  critical	  aspect	  of	  the	  discovery	  process—the	  activities	  of	  the	  scientists	  in	  putting	  the	  pieces	  together	  into	  a	  mechanistic	  hypothesis.	  As	  important	  as	  the	  constraints	  and	  strategies	  are,	  they	  typically	  do	  not	  completely	  dictate	  the	  design	  of	  the	  mechanism.	  And	  crucially,	  it	  is	  the	  scientists	  who	  impose	  the	  constraints,	  and	  the	  constraints	  are	  imposed	  upon	  their	  own	  understanding	  of	  the	  mechanism,	  embodied	  in	  what	  Craver	  and	  Darden	  call	  mechanism	  schemas	  (2013,	  ch.7).	  A	  robust	  philosophy	  of	  mechanistic	  science	  should	  not	  only	  assume	  that	  scientists	  fill	  this	  lacuna	  between	  available	  constraints	  (often	  derived	  from	  experiments)	  and	  proposals	  of	  mechanisms,	  but	  should	  offer	  an	  account	  of	  the	  cognitive	  activity	  involved	  in	  constructing	  mechanistic	  proposals.	  	  	  This	  activity	  produces	  hypotheses	  of	  possible	  mechanisms.	  Craver	  and	  Darden	  make	  much	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  how-­‐possibly	  and	  how-­‐actually	  accounts	  of	  mechanisms.	  In	  their	  treatment,	  how-­‐possibly	  accounts	  are	  regarded	  as	  valuable	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  serve	  as	  heuristics,	  and	  facilitate	  the	  design	  of	  experiments,	  which	  eventually	  enable	  the	  	  development	  of	  how-­‐actually	  accounts.	  Our	  focus	  lies	  elsewhere:	  in	  understanding	  the	  success	  involved	  in	  attaining	  how-­‐possibly	  accounts,	  without	  treating	  them	  simply	  as	  means	  to	  the	  ultimate	  end	  of	  how-­‐actually	  accounts.	  Often,	  scientists	  advance	  how-­‐possibly	  explanations	  before	  they	  are	  in	  any	  position	  to	  evaluate	  experimentally	  what	  is	  actual.	  Here	  we	  provide	  an	  account	  of	  this	  epistemic	  activity.	  Its	  central	  features	  are	  that	  it	  often	  involves	  visualization,	  it	  is	  creative	  in	  going	  beyond	  the	  given	  evidence	  and	  existing	  accounts,	  it	  is	  fictive	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  not	  entailing	  a	  commitment	  at	  the	  outset	  to	  the	  actuality	  of	  the	  results,	  and	  it	  allows	  for	  constrained	  flexibility	  in	  generating	  a	  design.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  features,	  we	  say	  that	  such	  reasoning	  processes	  are	  imaginative.	  Although	  researchers	  might	  aspire	  to	  an	  account	  of	  the	  actual	  mechanism	  responsible	  for	  a	  phenomenon,	  a	  fundamental	  part	  of	  their	  reasoning	  involves	  the	  imaginative	  generation	  of	  possible	  mechanisms.	  Imagining	  a	  possible	  mechanism	  that	  coheres	  with	  available	  evidence	  and	  is	  hypothetically	  capable	  of	  producing	  an	  explanandum	  phenomenon	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  success	  in	  scientific	  reasoning.	  We	  call	  this	  imaginative	  success.	  It	  is	  another	  step,	  subject	  to	  distinct	  norms	  of	  success,	  to	  evaluate	  whether	  the	  envisioned	  mechanism	  is	  “actually”	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the	  one	  responsible.	  A	  failure	  to	  find	  “the	  actual	  mechanism”	  is	  not	  a	  failure	  tout	  court.	  Here	  we	  are	  mainly	  interested	  in	  understanding	  imaginative	  success.	  	  	  If	  one	  views	  imagination	  as	  involving	  private	  “flights	  of	  fancy”	  operating	  exclusively	  in	  the	  heads	  of	  scientists	  and	  not	  directly	  accessible	  by	  others,	  then	  one	  might	  dismiss	  as	  impossible	  any	  investigation	  into	  scientific	  imagination.	  This	  is	  not	  our	  view.	  External	  representations	  (sometimes	  words,	  but	  typically	  diagrams)	  provide	  public	  expressions	  of	  imaginative	  reasoning.	  Even	  when	  all	  we	  have	  are	  published	  diagrams,	  we	  can	  view	  them	  as	  traces	  of	  the	  imaginative	  processes	  the	  researchers	  went	  through	  in	  developing	  hypothetical	  mechanistic	  explanations.	  But,	  more	  strongly,	  imaginative	  reasoning	  is	  often	  performed	  interactively	  with	  external	  representations	  (cf.	  Kirsh	  &	  Maglio,	  1994).	  Rather	  than	  trying	  to	  keep	  an	  internal	  visualization	  “in	  the	  mind's	  eye,”	  scientists	  frequently	  report	  drawing	  diagrams	  of	  hypothetical	  mechanisms	  as	  they	  are	  reasoning,	  and	  not	  as	  a	  post-­‐hoc	  expression.	  In	  many	  cases,	  the	  draft	  diagrams	  are	  lost	  from	  the	  record,	  but	  they	  are	  sometimes	  available,	  and	  provide	  evidence	  of	  intermediate	  steps	  in	  scientists'	  imaginative	  reasoning	  (cf.	  Burnston,	  Sheredos,	  Abrahamsen	  and	  Bechtel,	  2014).	  Regarding	  the	  design	  of	  external	  representations	  as	  often	  integral	  to	  scientists'	  imaginative	  success	  in	  developing	  a	  mechanistic	  explanation,	  we	  treat	  diagrams	  as	  entrees	  into	  their	  imaginative	  reasoning.	  	  We	  begin	  in	  section	  2	  by	  articulating	  our	  working	  conception	  of	  imagination.	  A	  key	  aspect	  of	  the	  diagrams	  that	  provide	  our	  window	  into	  the	  activity	  of	  imagination	  is	  that	  they	  are	  visual	  representations	  that	  use	  space.	  Sometimes	  the	  space	  in	  the	  diagram	  represents	  physical	  space,	  but	  often	  it	  does	  not	  and	  we	  will	  discuss	  the	  different	  spaces	  used	  in	  imagining	  mechanisms.	  To	  make	  our	  discussion	  of	  the	  roles	  of	  imagination	  in	  the	  design	  of	  mechanisms	  more	  concrete,	  in	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  paper	  we	  examine	  the	  role	  imagination	  has	  played	  in	  developing	  mechanistic	  accounts	  in	  the	  scientific	  field	  concerned	  with	  the	  generation	  of	  circadian	  rhythms	  in	  cyanobacteria.	  In	  section	  3	  we	  focus	  on	  imaginative	  mechanism	  design,	  involving	  prototypical	  diagrams	  in	  which	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  components	  is	  presented.	  In	  section	  4	  we	  focus	  on	  how	  researchers	  imagine	  these	  mechanisms	  operating	  to	  generate	  the	  phenomenon.	  In	  the	  simplest	  case	  this	  involves	  mental	  simulation,	  but	  often	  the	  designs	  biologists	  have	  constructed	  are	  too	  complex	  (involving	  non-­‐sequential	  execution	  of	  non-­‐linear	  operations)	  to	  be	  simulated	  mentally.	  In	  such	  circumstances,	  researchers	  turn	  to	  simulations	  using	  computational	  models	  to	  determine	  how	  the	  mechanism	  will	  behave	  and	  sometimes	  to	  understand	  why	  it	  produces	  the	  phenomenon	  (Bechtel	  &	  Abrahamsen,	  2010).	  In	  constructing	  simulations,	  researchers	  often	  begin	  with	  a	  mechanism	  diagram,	  identifying	  the	  properties	  of	  parts	  as	  variables	  and	  of	  operations	  as	  parameters,	  and	  use	  this	  to	  guide	  the	  construction	  of	  mathematical	  equations	  (Jones	  &	  Wolkenhauer,	  2012).	  We	  consider	  this	  one	  of	  the	  clearest	  cases	  in	  which	  imaginative	  success	  involves	  the	  use	  of	  external	  visualizations.	  	  
2.	  A	  Working	  Characterization	  of	  Scientific	  Imagination	  	  We	  characterize	  the	  scientific	  reasoning	  involved	  in	  positing	  hypothetical	  mechanisms	  (or,	  in	  creating	  “how-­‐possibly”	  models)	  as	  imaginative.	  In	  saying	  this,	  we	  mean	  to	  communicate	  that	  such	  reasoning	  exhibits	  features	  that	  are	  paradigmatically	  associated	  with	  “imagination”	  as	  it	  is	  understood	  by	  the	  folk,	  by	  philosophers,	  and	  in	  science.	  A	  “definition”	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of	  imagination	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  forthcoming	  (cf.	  Thomas,	  1999)	  and	  we	  do	  not	  propose	  that	  what	  we	  call	  “imaginative	  reasoning”	  has	  all	  the	  features	  one	  might	  attribute	  to	  some	  variety	  of	  imagination	  or	  other.	  But	  by	  most	  accounts,	  something	  will	  count	  as	  worthy	  of	  the	  title	  “imagination”	  if	  it	  has	  the	  following	  four	  features.	  	  	  First,	  as	  the	  name	  itself	  suggests,	  imagination	  has	  historically	  been	  regarded	  as	  imagistic	  in	  that	  it	  involves	  sensory	  representations	  of	  objects	  in	  some	  modality	  or	  other.	  In	  this	  it	  is	  like	  perception,	  and	  perhaps	  unlike	  abstract	  thought.1	  Second,	  it	  is	  also	  paradigmatically	  
fictive,	  in	  that	  imagined	  objects	  are	  not	  presumed	  to	  be	  actual.	  Although	  what	  one	  imagines	  may	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  the	  case,	  in	  the	  first	  instance	  an	  imaginative	  act	  is	  not	  itself	  an	  act	  that	  necessarily	  carries	  any	  ontic	  import.	  In	  this	  it	  is	  unlike	  belief	  about	  the	  way	  the	  world	  is.	  Third,	  imagination	  is	  paradigmatically	  creative.	  In	  memory,	  one	  simply	  “calls	  to	  mind”	  something	  one	  had	  experienced	  before.	  One	  may	  not	  even	  seek	  to	  do	  so;	  instead	  a	  memory	  may	  simply	  “pop	  up.”	  In	  contrast,	  in	  imagination	  one	  paradigmatically	  tries	  to	  envision	  something	  new.	  Fourth,	  it	  is	  paradigmatically	  freely	  variable	  within	  some	  range	  of	  freedom.	  One	  cannot	  help	  but	  remember	  (or	  fail	  to	  remember)	  what	  has	  occurred	  in	  the	  past	  as	  one	  (perhaps	  mistakenly)	  remembers	  it.	  In	  contrast,	  in	  imagination	  one	  can	  paradigmatically	  vary	  features	  of	  the	  envisioned	  scene	  at	  will.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  every	  feature	  is	  freely	  variable,	  however.	  Some	  basic	  constraints	  inform	  all	  imagining	  (one	  cannot	  imagine	  a	  visible	  surface	  which	  has	  no	  apparent	  color).	  And	  some	  forms	  of	  imagining,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  are	  even	  more	  determinately	  constrained.	  	  	  Below,	  we	  will	  demonstrate	  that	  what	  we	  call	  “imaginative	  reasoning”	  has	  all	  of	  these	  intuitive	  features,	  and	  this	  is	  what	  we	  have	  in	  mind	  by	  calling	  it	  “imaginative.”	  We	  presume	  that	  the	  foregoing	  features	  are	  components	  of	  the	  folk	  view2.	  We	  do	  not,	  however,	  intend	  to	  be	  offering	  a	  kind	  of	  “ordinary	  language	  argument”	  regarding	  scientific	  reasoning.	  The	  features	  reviewed	  above	  are	  also	  common	  in	  philosophical	  views	  of	  imagination,	  even	  if	  not	  all	  of	  them	  are	  always	  centrally	  present.	  Thus	  Aristotle's	  De	  Anima	  clearly	  upholds	  the	  
imagistic	  and	  fictive	  character	  of	  imagination.	  Kant's	  first	  Critique	  contains	  a	  conception	  of	  (productive)	  imagination	  as	  having	  all	  four	  features.	  Husserl's	  phenomenology	  wields	  imagination	  as	  part	  of	  its	  methodology	  to	  study	  consciousness,	  emphasizing	  the	  last	  three	  features.	  Sartre's	  early	  work	  challenges	  Husserl	  on	  the	  	  imagistic	  character	  of	  imagination	  (though	  his	  view	  is	  not	  inconsistent	  with	  our	  gloss).	  He	  uses	  the	  term	  more	  widely	  than	  others,	  but	  clearly	  holds	  that	  it	  is	  in	  all	  cases	  fictive,	  and,	  in	  paradigmatic	  cases	  at	  least,	  
creative	  and	  freely	  variable.	  Strawson	  (1970)	  identifies	  all	  four	  features,	  lumping	  creativity	  and	  free	  variability	  together.	  	  	  Similarly,	  all	  four	  features	  are	  countenanced	  in	  scientific	  research	  on	  imagination.	  In	  scientific	  research,	  folk	  categories	  are	  often	  split	  into	  distinct	  targets	  of	  investigation.	  This	  is	  especially	  so	  in	  the	  case	  of	  folk	  psychological	  categories	  such	  as	  “memory”	  (cf.	  Bechtel	  2007)	  and	  the	  case	  is	  the	  same	  with	  “imagination.”	  Thus	  Boden’s	  (2004)	  analysis	  of	  
                                                            1 We are thus not pursuing a conception of “imagination” in terms of pretense, perspective-taking, or what is 
sometimes called “recreative imagination” (Curie & Ravenscroft 2002; Liao	  &	  Szabó	  Gendler 2010). We fully 
acknowledge that this is one sense of “imagination” and a worthy topic of study; we only ask proponents of it to 
extend us the same semantic courtesy. 
2 We grant, of course, that the folk conception may cover a surplus of components beyond this: see fn.1 above. 
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creative	  reasoning	  treats	  imagination	  mainly	  with	  regard	  to	  our	  features	  of	  creativity	  and	  
free	  variability,	  but	  is	  not	  centrally	  concerned	  with	  other	  features.	  	  Byrne	  (2005)	  distinguishes	  such	  “creative	  imagining”	  from	  “everyday	  imagining,”	  regarding	  the	  latter	  as	  centrally	  involving	  what	  we	  have	  called	  the	  fictive	  character	  of	  imagination;	  she	  refers	  to	  this	  as	  “counterfactual	  imagination.”	  Some	  researchers	  hold	  that	  any	  theory	  of	  mental	  imagery	  ought	  to	  provide	  a	  theory	  of	  imagination,	  upholding	  our	  claim	  that	  imagination	  is	  often	  regarded	  as	  imagistic	  (cf.	  Thomas,	  1999).	  	  	  We	  are	  not	  denying	  that	  there	  is	  significant	  debate	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  imagination	  (in	  general	  or	  in	  any	  of	  its	  more	  specific	  varieties),	  or	  claiming	  that	  there	  is	  a	  universally-­‐accepted	  taxonomy	  of	  forms	  of	  imagination,	  or	  claiming	  that	  it	  is	  widely	  held	  that	  all	  forms	  of	  imagination	  must	  involve	  all	  four	  of	  the	  features	  we	  have	  named.	  We	  acknowledge	  that	  other	  things	  one	  might	  wish	  to	  call	  “imagination”	  might	  involve	  features	  we	  have	  not	  listed	  here.	  For	  our	  purposes,	  what	  matters	  is	  only	  that	  if	  a	  reasoning	  process	  does	  involve	  all	  four	  of	  these	  features,	  it	  can	  aptly	  be	  called	  “imaginative.”	  This	  is	  what	  we	  seek	  to	  show	  regarding	  scientific	  reasoning	  involving	  diagrams	  as	  they	  posit	  hypothetical	  mechanisms.	  	  Insofar	  as	  we	  are	  appealing	  to	  diagrams	  in	  understanding	  scientific	  imagination,	  we	  are	  concerned	  specifically	  with	  visual	  representations.	  A	  diagram	  typically	  involves	  glyphs	  (shapes,	  arrows)	  situated	  in	  a	  space	  (Tversky,	  2011).	  Neither	  the	  glyphs	  nor	  the	  space	  needs	  to	  resemble	  what	  is	  being	  represented	  –	  resemblance	  is	  not	  required	  by	  our	  construal	  of	  imagination	  as	  imagistic.	  Although	  sometimes	  an	  iconographic	  shape	  is	  used	  to	  represent	  a	  particular	  object,	  at	  least	  as	  often	  an	  arbitrary	  shape	  (e.g.,	  an	  oval)	  is	  used.	  The	  lack	  of	  resemblance	  is	  even	  clearer	  in	  the	  case	  of	  space.	  Sometimes	  the	  two	  dimensions	  of	  a	  visual	  representation	  do	  correspond	  to	  physical	  space,	  as	  in	  maps	  that	  respect	  a	  “natural	  mapping”	  to	  worldly	  space.	  A	  visual	  representation	  of	  an	  ecosystem	  may	  show	  where	  different	  resources	  such	  as	  water	  are	  located	  and	  how	  different	  organisms	  are	  distributed	  through	  the	  space	  of	  the	  environment.	  But	  in	  reasoning	  about	  mechanisms,	  researchers	  often	  find	  it	  useful	  to	  employ	  abstract	  “spaces”	  whose	  dimensions	  are	  not	  anchored	  to	  the	  space	  of	  the	  physical	  world.	  A	  graph	  can	  be	  used,	  for	  example,	  to	  represent	  a	  range	  of	  values	  that	  can	  be	  assigned	  to	  mathematical	  variables	  in	  scientific	  accounts.	  A	  “location”	  in	  such	  an	  abstract	  space	  simply	  denotes	  that	  a	  represented	  object	  has	  certain	  quantitative	  properties	  within	  some	  range	  of	  possible	  quantities.	  Such	  an	  abstract	  form	  of	  space	  is	  employed	  in	  the	  state	  space	  plots	  we	  discuss	  in	  section	  4.	  In	  other	  cases,	  especially	  the	  mechanism	  diagrams	  we	  discuss	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  the	  spatial	  dimensions	  of	  ink	  on	  a	  page	  are	  not	  to	  be	  interpreted	  as	  depicting	  any	  objective	  space,	  or	  even	  as	  depicting	  an	  abstract	  quantitative	  space.	  Rather,	  space	  on	  the	  page	  is	  used	  merely	  to	  situate	  glyphs	  representing	  distinct	  components	  of	  a	  mechanism,	  and	  arrows	  are	  used	  to	  indicate	  functional	  connections	  between	  them.	   
 
3.	  Imagining	  a	  Mechanism	  	  	  In	  this	  section	  we	  will	  examine	  how	  diagrams	  figure	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  mechanistic	  hypotheses.	  The	  dominant	  20th	  century	  accounts	  of	  explanations	  treated	  explanation	  as	  involving	  subsumption	  of	  a	  phenomenon	  under	  laws,	  but	  laws	  don’t	  figure	  prominently	  in	  many	  domains	  of	  biology.	  Rather,	  biologists	  offer	  accounts	  of	  mechanisms	  when	  they	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attempt	  to	  explain	  phenomena.	  In	  recent	  decades,	  several	  philosophers	  of	  science	  (Bechtel	  &	  Richardson,	  1993/2010;	  Bechtel	  &	  Abrahamsen,	  2005;	  Machamer,	  Darden,	  &	  Craver,	  2000)	  have	  characterized	  mechanisms	  as	  consisting	  of	  parts	  performing	  operations	  organized	  to	  generate	  the	  phenomenon	  under	  appropriate	  conditions,	  and	  have	  characterized	  many	  of	  the	  strategies	  through	  which	  biologists	  search	  for	  the	  parts	  and	  operations	  of	  a	  mechanism.	  Once	  researchers	  think	  they	  have	  characterized	  parts	  and	  operations,	  their	  challenge	  is	  to	  figure	  out	  how	  they	  are	  organized	  so	  as	  to	  generate	  the	  phenomenon.	  Here	  diagrams	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  as	  external	  aids	  that	  enable	  researchers	  to	  imagine	  a	  mechanism	  by	  representing	  entities	  and	  relating	  these	  representations	  with	  arrows	  or	  other	  symbols	  whenever	  the	  operation	  of	  one	  is	  thought	  to	  produce	  or	  affect	  another.	  	  	  To	  illustrate	  the	  role	  of	  diagrams	  in	  reasoning	  about	  mechanisms	  we	  turn	  to	  research	  on	  the	  mechanism	  responsible	  for	  circadian	  rhythms	  in	  cyanobacteria.	  Circadian	  rhythms	  are	  endogenously	  generated	  oscillations	  which	  recur	  with	  a	  period	  of	  approximately	  24	  hours	  in	  the	  physiology	  or	  behavior	  of	  an	  organism,	  and	  which	  can	  be	  entrained	  to	  the	  light/dark	  cycle	  of	  the	  local	  environment.	  Often	  the	  basic	  circadian	  oscillations	  involve	  concentrations	  of	  molecules,	  but	  these	  then	  regulate	  a	  host	  of	  other	  biological	  functions	  by	  determining	  the	  time	  for	  the	  expression	  of	  relevant	  genes.	  The	  occurrence	  of	  such	  rhythms	  was	  only	  demonstrated	  in	  cyanobacteria	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  opening	  the	  way	  for	  inquiry	  into	  the	  responsible	  mechanism.	  Through	  screens	  of	  mutant	  bacteria	  with	  altered	  rhythms,	  Ishiura,	  Kutsuna,	  Aoki,	  Iwasaki,	  Andersson,	  Tanabe,	  Golden,	  Johnson,	  and	  Kondo	  (1998)	  identified	  three	  genes	  that	  seemed	  to	  figure	  in	  the	  generation	  of	  these	  rhythms—kaiA,	  kaiB,	  and	  kaiC.	  By	  that	  time,	  researchers	  investigating	  circadian	  rhythms	  in	  eukaryotic	  cells	  (especially	  in	  fruit	  flies	  and	  mice)	  had	  proposed	  that	  the	  core	  mechanism	  involved	  a	  transcription-­‐translation	  feedback	  loop	  (TTFL)	  in	  which	  the	  proteins	  produced	  from	  a	  gene	  feed	  back	  to	  inhibit	  their	  own	  expression.	  Oscillation	  would	  result	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  when	  the	  protein	  is	  in	  low	  concentration,	  its	  synthesis	  is	  enhanced,	  increasing	  its	  concentration,	  but	  with	  increased	  concentration,	  synthesis	  is	  inhibited,	  causing	  its	  concentration	  to	  drop.	  Ishiura	  et	  al.	  summarize	  the	  evidence	  that	  led	  them	  to	  propose	  a	  similar	  mechanism	  for	  the	  prokaryotic	  cyanobacteria	  Synechococcus	  elongatus:	  We	  suggest	  a	  feedback-­‐loop	  model	  for	  the	  circadian	  oscillator	  of	  Synechococcus.	  The	  following	  four	  sets	  of	  data—(i)	  mapping	  of	  various	  clock	  mutations	  to	  the	  kai	  cluster,	  (ii)	  rhythmicity	  in	  the	  expression	  of	  the	  kai	  genes,	  (iii)	  alteration	  of	  the	  rhythmicity	  of	  kai	  expression	  by	  the	  mutations	  mapped	  to	  the	  kai	  cluster,	  and	  (iv)	  elimination	  of	  rhythms	  caused	  by	  inactivation	  or	  overexpression	  of	  each	  kai	  gene—all	  support	  a	  model	  in	  which	  the	  kai	  genes	  are	  essential	  to	  the	  circadian	  clock,	  and	  the	  feedback	  regulation	  of	  the	  expression	  of	  the	  kai	  genes	  by	  their	  gene	  products	  generates	  the	  circadian	  oscillation	  in	  cyanobacteria	  (p.	  1521).	   
 The	  passage	  references	  the	  diagram	  reproduced	  in	  Figure	  1,	  which	  fleshes	  out	  how	  the	  researchers	  imagine	  the	  mechanism.	  We	  suspect	  that	  for	  many	  readers,	  it	  will	  be	  apparent	  how	  useful	  this	  diagram	  is	  for	  thinking	  about	  the	  hypothetical	  mechanism,	  and	  what	  aid	  it	  provides	  beyond	  the	  linguistic	  description	  given	  above.	  In	  this	  diagram	  the	  rectangle	  on	  the	  right	  represents	  the	  stretch	  of	  DNA	  where	  the	  kai	  genes	  reside	  while	  the	  proteins	  are	  shown	  in	  the	  box	  on	  the	  left.	  Arrows	  running	  right-­‐to-­‐left	  from	  the	  genes	  are	  labeled	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transcription	  and	  translation,	  and	  feedback	  loops,	  excitatory	  and	  inhibitory,	  are	  shown	  running	  left-­‐to-­‐right	  from	  the	  protein	  box	  to	  the	  DNA.	  	  	  
	  Figure	  1.	  Ishiura	  et	  al.’s	  proposal	  of	  a	  TTFL	  mechanism	  for	  generating	  circadian	  rhythms	  in	  cyanobacteria	  based	  on	  analogy	  with	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  had	  been	  identified	  in	  eukaryotic	  cells.	  In	  their	  caption,	  the	  authors	  comment:	  	  “Hatched	  box	  at	  left	  represents	  an	  unknown	  part	  of	  the	  feedback	  loop.	  X	  and	  Y	  are	  unidentified	  clock	  components.	  α	  and	  β are	  unidentified	  DNA	  binding	  proteins.”	  Note	  also	  the	  use	  of	  question	  marks	  to	  underscore	  this	  point.	  	  With	  this	  example,	  we	  can	  provide	  a	  preliminary	  illustration	  of	  how	  each	  of	  the	  four	  features	  of	  imagination	  are	  present,	  and	  why	  scientific	  reasoning	  involved	  in	  (a)	  crafting	  this	  diagram	  to	  convey,	  and	  (b)	  reading	  this	  diagram	  to	  understand,	  a	  hypothetical	  mechanism,	  is	  in	  our	  sense	  imaginative.	  	  
• The	  reasoning	  is	  imagistic	  insofar	  as	  it	  relies	  upon	  the	  drawn	  diagram.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  diagram's	  own	  spatiality	  (space	  on	  the	  page)	  is	  not	  systematically	  utilized	  to	  convey	  claims	  about	  worldly	  spatiality.	  For	  example,	  the	  shaded	  box	  at	  the	  left	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  depict	  that	  the	  Kai	  proteins	  reside	  in	  some	  intracellular	  compartment	  (there	  are	  no	  discrete	  intracellular	  compartments	  in	  prokaryotes).	  Rather	  it	  is	  being	  used	  to	  make	  a	  categorical	  claim:	  everything	  represented	  within	  the	  shaded	  box,	  including	  by	  the	  text,	  is	  regarded	  as	  poorly	  understood,	  and	  is	  set	  as	  a	  target	  of	  future	  investigation.	  Here	  the	  caption	  helps	  to	  specify	  the	  represented	  content,	  telling	  the	  reader	  how	  the	  image	  is	  to	  be	  understood.	  But	  often,	  ambiguities	  are	  left	  in	  place.	  For	  example,	  the	  diagram	  is	  not	  representing	  that	  the	  kai	  gene	  cluster	  is	  located	  “to	  the	  right”	  of	  the	  proteins.	  Likewise,	  the	  glyphs	  used	  to	  represent	  entities	  are	  abstract,	  and	  their	  shapes	  do	  not	  represent	  the	  shapes	  of	  those	  entities.	  Novices	  often	  misunderstand	  this	  (incorrectly	  inferring	  the	  location	  of	  the	  gene	  cluster	  or	  the	  shapes	  of	  entities)	  because	  reading	  the	  diagram	  does	  involve	  imagistic	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reasoning.	  These	  errors	  arise	  when	  one	  misunderstands	  how	  imagistic	  reasoning	  is	  to	  be	  deployed.	  A	  caption	  can	  clarify	  how	  to	  reason	  imagistically	  using	  the	  diagram,	  but	  the	  use	  of	  the	  diagram	  demands	  that	  one	  do	  so	  to	  understand	  the	  proposal.	  Moreover,	  as	  we	  have	  already	  suggested,	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  diagram	  surpasses	  mere	  verbal	  presentation	  in	  framing	  the	  hypothesis.	  
• It	  is	  fictive	  in	  that	  the	  authors	  are	  imagining	  (and	  inviting	  readers	  to	  imagine)	  how	  a	  mechanism	  might	  work	  in	  cyanobacteria,	  not	  simply	  reporting	  on	  results	  that	  had	  been	  established:	  while	  some	  of	  the	  parts	  and	  their	  relations	  are	  known,	  putting	  them	  together	  to	  form	  a	  mechanism	  which	  is	  capable	  of	  producing	  the	  phenomenon	  required	  a	  fair	  bit	  of	  speculation.	  The	  researchers	  are	  not	  asserting	  that	  the	  mechanism	  does	  in	  fact	  work	  this	  way,	  but	  rather	  showing	  how	  it	  would	  be	  functionally	  organized	  if	  it	  did.	  	  
• A	  great	  deal	  of	  creativity	  is	  involved	  insofar	  as	  there	  was,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  publication,	  no	  solid	  evidence	  that	  any	  prokaryote	  has	  a	  TTFL	  mechanism	  of	  the	  sort	  that	  had	  been	  discovered	  in	  eukaryotic	  cells.	  The	  researchers	  employ	  this	  diagram	  to	  formulate	  a	  novel,	  testable	  hypothesis.	  Moreover,	  creativity	  is	  involved	  in	  choosing	  arbitrary	  shapes	  and	  locations	  to	  convey	  the	  proposal,	  selectively	  foregrounding	  certain	  information	  and	  backgrounding	  other	  information	  (e.g.,	  location,	  shape).	  Finally,	  this	  diagram	  is	  inspired	  by	  similar	  box-­‐and-­‐arrow	  diagrams	  showing	  the	  organization	  of	  eukaryotic	  TTFLs,	  but	  the	  researchers	  must	  make	  creative	  alterations	  to	  fit	  the	  known	  data	  about	  cyanobacteria,	  reconceive	  the	  functional	  organization	  with	  new	  parts	  and	  players,	  and	  hypothesize	  unknown	  relations	  between	  them.	  	  	  	  
• To	  illustrate	  the	  constrained	  free	  variability	  involved	  here,	  we	  highlight	  the	  use	  of	  question	  marks	  in	  this	  figure.	  These	  indicate	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  details	  of	  the	  operations	  being	  proposed.	  Why	  then	  posit	  them	  at	  all?	  In	  most	  cases,	  they	  are	  posited	  because	  if	  the	  TTFL	  model	  is	  to	  be	  applied	  to	  cyanobacteria,	  then	  something	  must	  play	  the	  assigned	  roles:	  there	  must	  be	  some	  process	  of	  time-­‐delay,	  some	  additional	  clock	  components,	  and	  some	  DNA	  binding	  elements.	  The	  authors	  are	  constrained	  to	  posit	  such	  entities	  and	  activities	  in	  order	  to	  illustrate	  their	  creative	  hypothesis	  at	  all.	  By	  marking	  these	  posits	  with	  question	  marks,	  the	  authors	  indicate	  precisely	  where	  free	  variability	  is	  permitted	  in	  imagining	  a	  mechanism	  that	  fits	  this	  model.	  Where	  free	  variability	  is	  permitted	  in	  thinking	  of	  a	  mechanism,	  the	  mechanism’s	  parts	  and	  operations	  remain	  unknown,	  and	  thus	  serve	  as	  targets	  for	  future	  investigation.	  Of	  special	  note	  is	  the	  question	  mark	  after	  the	  word	  Interactions,	  as	  the	  relationships	  between	  the	  Kai	  proteins	  became	  the	  focus	  of	  research	  in	  the	  subsequent	  15	  years.	  	   	  	  Figure	  1	  represents	  the	  original	  proposal	  to	  apply	  the	  TTFL	  model	  to	  cyanobacteria.	  But	  the	  
imaginative	  character	  of	  scientists'	  reasoning	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  their	  initial	  formulations	  of	  the	  hypothesis.	  	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  compare	  this	  figure	  with	  Figure	  2,	  published	  just	  two	  years	  later	  by	  two	  of	  the	  same	  authors,	  Iwasaki	  and	  Kondo	  (2000).	  Many	  newly	  discovered	  parts	  (proteins)	  are	  shown	  in	  this	  diagram,	  such	  as	  CikA	  and	  SasA,	  which	  became	  focal	  objects	  of	  subsequent	  research.	  	  The	  question	  marks	  involving	  the	  interaction	  of	  the	  Kai	  proteins	  are	  gone.	  This	  reflects	  the	  growth	  of	  evidence	  during	  this	  period	  that	  KaiC	  binds	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ATP	  and	  autophosphorylates.	  KaiA	  was	  determined	  to	  increase	  the	  rate	  of	  KaiC	  autophosphorylation	  by	  binding	  to	  KaiC,	  whereas	  when	  KaiB	  binds	  KaiC,	  it	  was	  found	  to	  reduce	  the	  rate	  of	  phosphorylation	  and,	  if	  KaiC	  were	  already	  phosphorylated,	  to	  facilitate	  dephosphorylation.	  This	  cycle	  of	  phosphorylation	  and	  dephosphorylation	  of	  KaiC	  itself	  takes	  24	  hours,	  leading	  Ditty,	  Williams,	  and	  Golden	  (2003,	  p.	  524)	  to	  conclude	  that	  these	  posttranslational	  activities	  “are	  central	  to	  the	  timekeeping	  ability	  of	  the	  Kai	  oscillator.”	  What	  is	  important	  for	  our	  purposes	  here	  is	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  this	  diagram	  rules	  out	  whole	  domains	  of	  free	  variability	  in	  thinking	  about	  how	  the	  hypothetical	  mechanism	  might	  operate.3	  Figure	  1	  permits	  a	  viewer	  to	  wonder	  whether	  the	  Kai	  proteins	  interact;	  Figure	  2	  constrains	  a	  viewer	  to	  imagine	  that	  they	  do.	  Simultaneously,	  however,	  whole	  new	  domains	  of	  free	  variability	  are	  opened	  up	  in	  Figure	  2:	  the	  viewer	  is	  permitted	  to	  imagine	  any	  number	  of	  mechanisms	  whereby	  clock	  output	  might	  provide	  feedback	  to	  input	  mechanisms.	  While	  imagining	  a	  mechanism	  of	  cyanobacterial	  rhythmicity	  had	  become	  more	  constrained,	  it	  remained	  imaginative.	  	  
	  Figure	  2.	  Iwasaki	  and	  Kondo’s	  (2000)	  representation	  of	  the	  cyanobacterial	  clock	  mechanism.	  See	  text	  for	  details.	  	  This	  is	  clear	  if	  we	  attend	  to	  an	  important	  reorientation	  of	  later	  research.	  The	  focus	  on	  the	  phosphorylation	  and	  dephosphorylation	  of	  KaiC	  and	  its	  interactions	  with	  KaiA	  and	  KaiB	  became	  even	  more	  central	  as	  a	  result	  of	  two	  papers	  from	  the	  Kondo	  group	  in	  2005.	  In	  the	  first,	  Tomita,	  Nakajima,	  Kondo,	  and	  Iwasaki	  (2005)	  demonstrated	  sustained	  circadian	  rhythms	  when	  bacteria	  were	  maintained	  in	  darkness,	  or	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  transcription	  or	  translation	  inhibitors	  –	  that,	  is	  contexts	  in	  which	  no	  protein	  synthesis	  occurs.	  In	  the	  second,	  Nakajima,	  Imai,	  Ito,	  Nishiwaki,	  Murayama,	  Iwasaki,	  Oyama,	  and	  Kondo	  (2005)	  reported	  circadian	  rhythms	  in	  a	  preparation	  containing	  only	  the	  three	  Kai	  proteins	  and	  ATP.	  These	  
                                                            3 We cannot discuss it here, but the manner in which the “growth of evidence” enables researchers to import new 
constraints into their understanding of the mechanism relies on further details of how scientists reason using 
diagrams. Prototypically, a variety of data-graphics in many formats must be simultaneously deployed to work 
out the constraints before these can be used to construct a new mechanism diagram. Compare the role of data-
graphics in computational modeling, discussed in §4 below. 
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studies	  compellingly	  demonstrated	  the	  sufficiency	  of	  operations	  involving	  the	  proteins	  to	  sustain	  circadian	  rhythms:	  the	  TTFL	  model,	  previously	  borrowed	  from	  eukaryotic	  systems	  and	  applied	  to	  cyanobacteria,	  appeared	  to	  be	  false.	  Neither	  transcription	  nor	  translation	  was	  necessary	  for	  circadian	  rhythms	  in	  cyanobacteria.	  Concerted	  focus	  was	  now	  directed	  at	  the	  post-­‐translational	  processes	  by	  which	  the	  Kai	  proteins	  formed	  complexes	  and	  how	  KaiC	  was	  phosphorylated	  and	  dephosphorylated	  over	  a	  24-­‐hour	  period.	  	  In	  short,	  the	  hypothetical	  mechanisms	  posited	  in	  Figures	  1	  and	  2	  had	  been	  shown	  not	  to	  be	  the	  actual	  mechanisms	  centrally	  responsible	  for	  circadian	  rhythmicity	  in	  cyanobacteria.	  This	  underscores	  the	  fictive	  aspects	  of	  Figures	  1	  and	  2.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  “how-­‐possibly”	  models	  did	  not	  pan	  out,	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  scientific	  reasoning	  was	  involved	  not	  only	  in	  initially	  proposing	  the	  TTFL	  model	  for	  cyanobacteria,	  but	  also	  in	  incorporating	  parts	  and	  operations	  suggested	  by	  new	  evidence	  into	  it,	  and	  in	  repeatedly	  wielding	  the	  model	  to	  identify	  new	  targets	  of	  research.	  In	  our	  presentation,	  one	  can	  think	  of	  research	  as	  proceeding	  by	  relentlessly	  closing	  off	  domains	  of	  free	  variability	  and	  opening	  up	  others.	  We	  regard	  this	  as	  a	  notable	  form	  of	  ongoing	  success	  in	  scientific	  research:	  it	  is	  no	  simple	  feat	  to	  take	  a	  mechanistic	  model	  built	  for	  one	  class	  of	  organisms,	  apply	  it	  wholesale	  to	  another,	  and	  provide	  an	  articulate	  depiction	  of	  how	  the	  resulting	  hypothetical	  mechanism	  could	  actually	  be	  constituted	  so	  as	  to	  produce	  the	  target	  phenomenon.	  Likewise,	  it	  is	  no	  simple	  feat	  to	  adapt	  such	  a	  model	  in	  the	  face	  of	  new	  data.	  While	  the	  models	  discussed	  above	  proved	  to	  be	  factually	  inaccurate,	  we	  regard	  the	  researchers	  as	  having	  attained	  a	  kind	  of	  
imaginative	  success	  simply	  by	  constructing	  the	  diagrams	  above.	  The	  success	  consists	  in	  integrating	  known	  data	  regarding	  cyanobacteria,	  fitting	  these	  into	  a	  generalized	  hypothesis	  regarding	  TTFLs	  as	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  circadian	  rhythms,	  generating	  a	  new,	  specific	  model	  of	  how	  such	  a	  mechanism	  could	  work	  in	  this	  case,	  and	  identifying	  the	  gaps	  in	  this	  new	  model	  as	  a	  way	  of	  driving	  research	  forward.	  	  	  This	  kind	  of	  success	  is	  common	  in	  scientific	  research,	  wherein	  piecemeal	  discoveries	  are	  synthesized	  into	  cohesive,	  mechanistic	  hypotheses	  which	  have	  only	  provisional	  standing	  as	  how-­‐possibly	  models.	  The	  success	  we	  are	  highlighting	  does	  not	  consist	  in	  reaching	  an	  end-­‐
point	  of	  scientific	  explanation,	  at	  which	  scientific	  reasoning	  about	  this	  topic	  can	  cease	  and	  be	  diverted	  elsewhere.	  The	  success	  consists	  rather	  in	  advancing	  beyond	  limited	  data,	  instead	  of	  stagnating,	  by	  sketching	  out	  a	  model	  which	  (a)	  suggests	  unidentified	  parts	  and	  operations	  as	  targets	  of	  future	  research,	  and	  (b)	  suggests	  new	  ways	  of	  experimenting	  on	  known	  parts	  and	  operations,	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  model	  fits.	  In	  attaining	  imaginative	  success,	  scientists	  are	  actively	  succeeding	  in	  their	  ongoing	  endeavors.	  	  Such	  imaginative	  success	  is	  presupposed	  in	  any	  case	  where	  a	  mechanistic	  hypothesis	  is	  put	  forth,	  and	  subsequently	  thought	  to	  be	  correct	  –	  any	  time	  a	  “how-­‐possibly”	  model	  gets	  polemically	  upgraded	  to	  the	  status	  of	  a	  “how-­‐actually”	  model,	  and	  scientific	  reasoning	  is	  retroactively	  reified	  as	  a	  finished	  “success.”	  	  Turning	  the	  focus	  to	  the	  Kai	  proteins	  generated	  a	  new	  set	  of	  challenges	  for	  research	  on	  the	  cyanobacterial	  clock:	  TTFL	  mechanisms	  had	  been	  sufficiently	  studied,	  including	  with	  computational	  models,	  that	  researchers	  felt	  they	  understood	  how	  they	  could	  generate	  sustained	  circadian	  oscillations.	  They	  lacked	  such	  understanding	  for	  how	  phosphorylation	  and	  dephosphorylation	  of	  KaiC	  could	  generate	  sustained	  oscillations.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	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question	  of	  how	  the	  central	  clock	  in	  cyanobacteria	  could	  function	  was	  essentially	  a	  wide-­‐open	  domain	  of	  relatively	  free	  variability.	  Two	  basic	  constraints	  that	  all	  researchers	  came	  to	  accept	  were	  that	  phosphorylation	  could	  occur	  at	  two	  loci	  on	  Kai	  C	  –	  serine	  residue	  431	  (S)	  and	  threonine	  432	  (T)	  –	  and	  it	  would	  take	  24	  hours	  to	  complete	  the	  cycle	  of	  phosphorylation	  and	  dephosphorylation.	  	  The	  problem,	  as	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  3B,	  is	  that,	  as	  typical	  of	  biochemical	  reactions,	  each	  of	  these	  steps	  is	  in	  principle	  reversible.	  This	  suggested	  an	  additional	  constraint:	  without	  something	  driving	  the	  mechanism	  to	  carry	  out	  only	  the	  clockwise	  sequence,	  the	  mechanism	  would	  not	  oscillate	  but	  settle	  into	  a	  steady	  state.	  	  	  The	  other	  diagrams	  in	  Figure	  3	  originated	  with	  two	  research	  groups	  that	  proposed	  different	  mechanisms	  that	  could	  meet	  these	  constraints.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  their	  electron	  micrograph	  studies	  showing	  the	  differential	  binding	  of	  KaiC	  with	  KaiA	  and	  KaiB	  at	  different	  times	  of	  day,	  Mori,	  Williams,	  Byrne,	  Qin,	  Egli,	  McHaourab,	  Stewart,	  and	  Johnson	  (2007)	  advanced	  the	  hypothesis	  represented	  in	  Figure	  3A.	  Lavender	  arrows	  show	  the	  progression	  of	  KaiC	  through	  its	  phosphorylation	  cycle.	  A	  key	  aspect	  of	  their	  proposal,	  symbolized	  by	  the	  asterisk	  by	  KaiC	  and	  its	  dark	  blue	  coloration	  at	  the	  bottom	  and	  on	  the	  left	  of	  the	  figure,	  is	  that	  as	  a	  result	  of	  phosphorylation	  and	  binding	  with	  KaiB,	  KaiC	  changes	  its	  conformation	  to	  a	  form	  that	  inhibits	  phosphorylation	  and	  promotes	  dephosphorylation.	  This	  conformational	  change	  was	  hypothesized	  to	  help	  drive	  the	  phosphorylation	  cycle	  in	  its	  observed	  progression.	  There	  was	  little	  evidence	  for	  this	  imaginative	  proposal,	  but	  Mori	  et	  al.	  included	  a	  computational	  model	  to	  show	  that	  such	  a	  mechanism	  could	  generate	  sustained	  oscillations.	  (There	  was	  more	  evidence	  for	  the	  operations,	  shown	  in	  the	  center	  of	  the	  figure,	  of	  monomer	  exchange,	  in	  which	  monomers	  from	  different	  hexamers	  exchange,	  enabling	  different	  hexamers	  to	  synchronize	  with	  each	  other.) 
	  	  	   	  Figure	  3.	  Early	  proposals	  for	  a	  mechanism	  producing	  oscillations	  through	  phosphorylation	  and	  dephosphorylation	  of	  KaiC.	  A.	  Mori	  et	  al.’s	  (2007)	  proposal	  involving	  a	  conformation	  change	  from	  KaiC	  to	  KaiC*.	  B	  and	  C.	  Rust	  et	  al.’s	  (2007)	  proposal	  based	  on	  phosphorylation	  at	  different	  sites	  on	  KaiC.	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  Figures	  3B	  and	  3C,	  from	  Rust,	  Markson,	  Lane,	  Fisher,	  and	  O'Shea	  (2007),	  reflect	  these	  authors’	  discovery	  that	  there	  is	  a	  specific	  sequence	  of	  phosphorylation	  and	  dephosphorylation	  at	  the	  S	  and	  T	  loci—T	  is	  the	  first	  site	  phosphorylated,	  followed	  by	  S,	  and	  T	  is	  the	  first	  site	  dephosphorylated,	  followed	  by	  S.	  As	  a	  result,	  given	  the	  current	  phosphorylation	  state	  of	  KaiC,	  there	  is	  no	  ambiguity	  as	  to	  what	  stage	  of	  the	  phosphorylation	  rhythm	  KaiC	  is	  in.	  This	  allowed	  researchers	  to	  close	  off	  one	  domain	  of	  free	  
variability,	  imposing	  a	  clear	  constraint	  on	  how	  to	  think	  of	  the	  cyclical	  progression	  of	  KaiC's	  phosphorylation	  rhythm.	  Into	  the	  representation	  in	  Figure	  3B,	  in	  Figure	  3C	  Rust	  et	  al.	  inserted	  representations	  of	  KaiA	  and	  KaiB,	  using	  arrows	  to	  represent	  their	  hypothesis:	  	  until	  KaiB	  is	  added	  to	  KaiC	  in	  the	  S-­‐phosphoform,	  KaiA	  drives	  the	  system	  towards	  phosphorylation,	  but	  once	  enough	  of	  a	  concentration	  of	  the	  S-­‐phosphoform	  emerges,	  KaiB	  interacts	  to	  repress	  KaiA,	  and	  these	  interactions	  between	  the	  Kai	  proteins	  drive	  the	  one-­‐way	  progression	  of	  the	  phosphorylation	  rhythm.	  Like	  Mori	  et	  al.,	  the	  authors	  devised	  a	  computational	  model,	  showing	  that	  their	  mechanism	  could	  not	  only	  produce	  sustained	  oscillations,	  but	  also	  replicated	  precise	  quantitative	  dynamics	  of	  the	  abundance	  of	  KaiC	  phosphoforms	  exhibited	  by	  an	  in	  vitro	  oscillator.	   
 Given	  that	  Rust	  et	  al.	  started	  with	  the	  data	  about	  the	  order	  of	  phosphorylation	  at	  the	  S	  and	  T	  sites,	  and	  with	  data	  about	  all	  the	  entities	  involved,	  one	  may	  question	  whether	  their	  hypothesis	  counts	  as	  imaginative.	  In	  particular,	  one	  may	  question	  whether	  it	  is	  fictive.	  What	  is	  fictive	  in	  this	  case	  is	  not	  the	  order	  of	  phosphorylation	  and	  dephosphorylation	  at	  the	  two	  loci,	  or	  the	  roles	  of	  KaiA	  and	  KaiC	  in	  affecting	  KaiC's	  phosphorylation.	  Rather,	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  these	  activities,	  working	  in	  concert,	  sufficed	  to	  generate	  circadian	  (~24-­‐h)	  oscillations	  is	  fictive.	  Here	  the	  fictive	  character	  of	  scientists'	  reasoning	  concerns	  not	  the	  
structure	  of	  the	  mechanism,	  but	  its	  precise	  dynamics.	  As	  we	  shall	  discuss	  further	  in	  section	  4	  below,	  the	  researchers	  relied	  heavily	  on	  imaginative	  reasoning	  to	  develop	  a	  computational	  model	  to	  show	  that	  the	  set	  of	  operations	  identified	  would	  suffice	  to	  account	  for	  the	  precise	  quantitative	  dynamics	  of	  circadian	  oscillations	  observed	  in	  vitro.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  proposal	  was	  soon	  widely	  embraced	  does	  not	  detract	  from	  its	  creativity.	  Moreover,	  the	  proposal	  left	  many	  domains	  of	  free	  variability,	  especially	  concerning	  the	  exact	  time-­‐course	  of	  each	  operation.	  These	  are	  still	  being	  pursued,	  in	  part	  by	  detailed	  sub-­‐molecular	  inquiries.	  None	  of	  these	  issues	  is	  taken	  up	  by	  Mori	  at	  al.,	  or	  by	  Rust	  et	  al.	  That	  research	  can	  proceed	  apace	  without	  settling	  such	  questions	  does	  not	  mean	  they	  have	  been	  adequately	  settled.	  Likewise,	  that	  a	  fictive	  inference	  strategy	  commands	  widespread	  consensus	  as	  a	  heuristic	  does	  not	  make	  it	  any	  less	  fictive.	  What	  Rust	  et	  al.'s	  case	  illustrates	  is	  that	  the	  norms	  of	  imaginative	  success	  may	  be	  so	  widely	  shared	  within	  a	  field	  that	  they	  go	  without	  much	  explicit	  mention	  at	  all.	  It	  goes	  without	  saying	  that	  more	  work	  must	  be	  done	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  hypothetical	  mechanism	  is	  actually	  present	  within	  a	  cyanobacterium.	  	  So	  far	  we	  have	  focused	  on	  published	  diagrams	  that	  reflect	  how	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  papers	  imagined	  the	  interaction	  of	  operations	  constituting	  the	  mechanism	  when	  they	  published	  the	  paper.	  We	  conclude	  this	  section	  with	  an	  example	  in	  which	  we	  had	  access	  to	  drafts	  of	  diagrams	  the	  researchers	  generated	  in	  the	  course	  of	  formulating	  their	  proposed	  mechanism.	  With	  attention	  to	  this	  case,	  we	  show	  that	  the	  researchers	  imaginatively	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explored	  diagrammatic	  possibilities	  in	  a	  self-­‐conscious	  attempt	  to	  attain	  the	  type	  of	  imaginative	  success	  we	  have	  characterized	  in	  discussing	  published	  diagrams.	   
 With	  the	  discovery	  that	  the	  Kai	  proteins	  could	  oscillate	  in	  vitro,	  many	  researchers	  temporarily	  restricted	  their	  investigations,	  operating	  on	  the	  fictive	  assumption	  that	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  in	  vitro	  oscillator	  would	  carry	  over,	  somehow,	  to	  the	  in	  vivo	  case.	  When	  it	  came	  time	  to	  re-­‐situate	  the	  Kai	  oscillator	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  living	  cell,	  a	  pressing	  question	  was	  how	  to	  understand	  the	  link	  between	  KaiC's	  phosphorylation	  rhythms	  and	  clock	  output.	  In	  cyanobacteria,	  the	  clock	  regulates	  transcription	  of	  the	  entire	  genome,	  with	  one	  class	  of	  genes	  achieving	  maximal	  expression	  at	  dusk	  and	  another	  at	  dawn.	  As	  the	  activity	  at	  the	  promoters	  upstream	  of	  genes	  govern	  their	  expression,	  researchers	  accordingly	  differentiated	  	  “class	  I”	  and	  “class	  II”	  promoters.	  Paddock,	  Boyd,	  Adin,	  and	  Golden	  (2013)	  investigated	  which	  phosphoform	  of	  KaiC	  affected	  gene	  transcription.	  They	  advanced	  evidence	  that	  the	  S	  phosphoform	  is	  involved	  in	  both	  the	  inhibition	  of	  class	  I	  promoters	  (such	  as	  the	  one	  governing	  the	  kaiB	  and	  kaiC	  genes)	  and	  also	  the	  activation	  of	  class	  II	  promoters.	  Notably,	  Paddock	  et	  al.	  could	  neither	  cite	  nor	  offer	  clear	  data	  regarding	  
how	  the	  S	  phosphoform	  has	  this	  downstream	  effect.	  The	  most	  direct	  relationship	  would	  be	  for	  the	  S	  phosphoform	  to	  simply	  bind	  DNA	  and	  regulate	  gene	  expression,	  but	  there	  was	  (and	  remains)	  little	  evidence	  to	  support	  this	  view	  since	  KaiC	  does	  not	  possess	  any	  known	  DNA	  binding	  domain.	  Paddock	  et	  al.	  ingeniously	  devised	  a	  measure	  of	  “Oscillator	  Output	  Activity”	  (OOA)	  that	  circumvented	  these	  questions.	  The	  measure	  takes	  the	  expression	  of	  class	  I	  and	  class	  II	  genes	  (measured	  by	  bioluminescence)	  that	  are	  observed	  in	  cyanobacteria	  containing	  a	  mimetic	  of	  one	  of	  KaiC's	  phosphoforms,	  and	  subtracts	  from	  this	  the	  expression	  observed	  in	  a	  total	  kaiC-­‐knockout	  (lacking	  all	  phosphoforms).	  The	  result	  is	  a	  set	  of	  measurements	  showing	  how	  much	  the	  expression	  of	  each	  class	  of	  genes	  can	  be	  ultimately	  attributed	  to	  each	  KaiC	  phosphoform.	  Without	  knowing	  the	  mechanism	  of	  how	  the	  S	  phosphoform	  regulates	  clock	  output,	  Paddock	  et	  al.	  were	  able	  to	  demonstrate	  convincingly	  that	  it	  did,	  and	  that,	  in	  their	  preparation	  in	  which	  native	  Kai-­‐C	  was	  knocked	  out,	  no	  other	  phosphoform	  did.	  A	  whole	  domain	  of	  free	  variability	  regarding	  the	  previously-­‐known	  effects	  of	  KaiC	  in	  inhibiting	  class	  I	  and	  activating	  class	  II	  promoters	  could	  thus	  be	  closed	  off	  as	  these	  were	  now	  shown	  to	  be	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  S	  phosphoform.	  Yet	  simultaneously,	  the	  details	  of	  this	  newly-­‐identified	  S	  phosphoform	  output	  pathway	  remained	  a	  domain	  of	  free	  variability. 
 As	  they	  were	  working	  out	  their	  account	  of	  the	  S	  phosphoform	  output	  pathway,	  the	  authors	  produced	  numerous	  diagrams	  that	  appeared	  in	  different	  drafts	  of	  the	  paper	  from	  January	  to	  April	  of	  2013.	  Three	  of	  these	  are	  shown	  in	  Figure	  5.	  Figure	  5A	  appeared	  in	  the	  January	  drafts	  of	  the	  paper	  when	  the	  authors	  focused	  just	  on	  the	  affects	  of	  the	  S-­‐phosphoform	  in	  inhibiting	  the	  class	  I	  and	  activating	  the	  class	  II	  promoters.	  (In	  these	  figures	  the	  S	  phosphoform	  is	  labeled	  “KaiC-­‐pST”	  meaning	  that	  while	  the	  seronine	  site	  is	  phoshorylated	  –	  hence	  the	  “p”	  preceding	  the	  “S”	  –	  the	  threonine	  site	  is	  not	  –	  hence,	  no	  “p”	  preceding	  the	  “T”).	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  Figure	  5.	  Three	  figures	  developed	  by	  Paddock	  et	  al.	  in	  which	  they	  explore	  possible	  ways	  of	  relating	  the	  S-­‐phosphoform	  and	  RpaA	  to	  the	  two	  classes	  of	  gene	  promoters	  in	  cyanobacteria.	  Only	  the	  last	  appeared	  in	  the	  published	  paper.	  	  Subsequently,	  the	  authors	  expanded	  the	  focus	  of	  their	  paper	  to	  consider	  the	  relation	  between	  their	  newly-­‐discovered	  output	  pathway	  from	  the	  S-­‐phosphoform,	  and	  a	  previously	  identified	  output	  pathway	  involving	  SasA	  and	  RpaA	  (shown	  in	  Figure	  2	  above,	  where	  RpaA	  is	  simply	  designated	  response	  regulator).	  Panel	  B	  appeared	  in	  drafts	  in	  March	  and	  early	  April.	  Note	  the	  bifurcated	  use	  of	  space.	  On	  the	  left	  side,	  space	  on	  the	  page	  is	  not	  to	  be	  interpreted	  as	  systematically	  depicting	  any	  worldly	  space:	  the	  S	  phosphoform,	  shown	  at	  the	  bottom,	  is	  not	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  “below”	  the	  T	  phosphoform,	  shown	  at	  the	  top.	  Despite	  that,	  the	  proximity	  of	  the	  glyphs	  for	  each	  of	  the	  Kai	  proteins	  is	  meant	  to	  convey	  spatial	  proximity	  and	  entanglement	  (binding)	  of	  the	  represented	  proteins:	  KaiA	  and	  KaiB	  are	  shown	  bound	  to	  the	  S	  phosphoform	  of	  KaiC.	  Meanwhile,	  on	  the	  right	  side	  of	  the	  panel,	  there	  is	  a	  mock-­‐up	  (red	  line)	  of	  a	  quantitative	  graph	  showing	  observed	  oscillations.	  To	  a	  researcher	  of	  circadian	  rhythms,	  this	  simple	  waveform	  is	  iconic,	  and	  would	  be	  taken	  immediately	  to	  represent	  peaks	  and	  troughs	  of	  gene	  expression	  over	  several	  days.	  And	  yet,	  since	  no	  axes	  are	  specified,	  this	  “abstract”	  space	  cannot	  be	  systematically	  interpreted	  and	  assigned	  any	  clear	  quantitative	  values.	  	  Running	  from	  left	  to	  right	  across	  the	  panel	  are	  several	  lines.	  The	  solid	  arrows,	  running	  from	  the	  S	  phosphoform	  to	  peaks	  on	  the	  pseudo-­‐graph,	  indicates	  that	  output	  from	  KaiC	  is	  at	  its	  peak	  when	  the	  abundance	  of	  the	  S	  phosphoform	  is	  at	  its	  peak.	  The	  dotted	  lines,	  running	  from	  the	  other	  phosphoforms	  to	  the	  trough	  on	  the	  pseudo-­‐graph,	  indicate	  that	  output	  from	  kaiC	  when	  the	  S	  phosphoform	  is	  not	  abundant	  remains	  at	  the	  same	  low	  level	  as	  in	  the	  KaiC	  knockout.4	  The	  challenge	  was	  to	  imagine	  how	  the	  newly-­‐identified	  output	  pathway	  involving	  the	  S	  phosphoform	  interacts	  with	  the	  previously-­‐known	  output	  pathway	  involving	  SasA	  and	  RpaA.	  Both	  SasA	  and	  RpaA	  exhibit	  circadian	  cycles	  in	  their	  own	  phosphorylation	  (they	  are	  considered	  active	  when	  phosphorylated);	  hence	  RpaA	  is	  shown	  with	  a	  circle.	  The	  relation	  between	  KaiC	  oscillation	  and	  RpaA	  oscillation	  is	  purposefully	  left	  vague	  since	  the	  relative	  timing	  of	  these	  oscillations	  is	  not	  known.	  In	  their	  experimental	  work,	  Paddock	  et	  al.	  had	  found	  that	  RpaA	  knockouts	  exhibited	  the	  opposite	  effect	  on	  OOA	  as	  KaiC	  knockouts.	  Hence,	  in	  these	  diagrams,	  they	  show	  RpaA	  has	  inhibiting	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  KaiC	  phosphoforms.	  	  	  Panel	  B	  only	  shows	  RpaA	  opposing	  the	  output	  from	  the	  S-­‐phosphoform,	  not	  the	  specifics	  of	  what	  it	  does.	  The	  authors	  flesh	  out	  their	  idea	  in	  April	  when	  they	  produced	  a	  first	  draft	  of	  
                                                            4 The measure of Oscillator Output Activity does not distinguish between the S phosphoform's role in inhibiting 
Class I genes and activating Class II genes: both of these are simply “output activity.”  
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the	  diagram	  in	  panel	  C,	  which	  eventually	  appeared	  in	  the	  published	  paper.	  They	  now	  hypothesize	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  class	  I	  promoters,	  activated	  RpaA	  both	  inhibits	  the	  inhibitory	  pathway	  from	  the	  S-­‐phosphoform	  and	  directly	  activates	  the	  promoter.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  class	  II	  promoters	  RpaA	  is	  presented	  as	  simply	  inhibiting	  the	  activating	  role	  of	  the	  S-­‐phosphoform.	  Even	  this	  figure	  is	  challenging	  to	  understand,	  since	  an	  important	  factor	  is	  that	  phosphorylation	  of	  RpaA	  peaks	  out	  of	  phase	  with	  the	  S	  phosphoform,	  so	  that	  when	  phosphorylated,	  RpaA	  is	  inhibiting	  already	  reduced	  output	  from	  the	  S	  phosphoform,	  and	  when	  the	  S	  phosphoform	  is	  most	  affecting	  the	  output,	  RpaA	  is	  relatively	  unphosphorylated	  and	  exerting	  minimal	  effect.	  	  	  	  For	  our	  purposes	  here,	  what	  is	  striking	  is	  the	  diversity	  of	  diagrammatic	  formats	  that	  the	  authors	  constructed	  in	  the	  attempt	  to	  articulate	  and	  communicate	  their	  hypothetical	  mechanism,	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  work	  that	  went	  into	  devising	  a	  diagram	  that	  was	  adequate	  to	  this	  task.	  We	  have	  provided	  here	  only	  a	  small	  sampling	  of	  the	  formats	  the	  authors	  drafted.	  Even	  with	  this	  small	  sample,	  we	  can	  see	  the	  kinds	  of	  difficulties	  that	  make	  
imaginative	  success	  so	  highly	  prized.	  Panel	  A	  draws	  upon	  previously-­‐established	  conventions	  for	  depicting	  the	  KaiC	  oscillator	  (compare	  Figure	  4	  above).	  To	  these	  it	  adds	  a	  concise	  addendum	  to	  indicate	  which	  phosphoform	  of	  KaiC	  is	  critical	  to	  output.	  Unfortunately,	  it	  does	  not	  include	  information	  about	  RpaA's	  role	  in	  output.	  In	  this	  regard,	  panel	  A	  was	  regarded	  by	  its	  designers	  as	  what	  we	  would	  call	  a	  (partial)	  imaginative	  failure:	  it	  fails	  to	  put	  forth	  an	  hypothesis	  which	  incorporates	  all	  known	  constraints,	  and	  fails	  to	  integrate	  all	  parts	  of	  the	  mechanism	  which	  are	  known	  to	  be	  relevant	  into	  a	  cohesive	  proposal.	  There	  is	  still	  imaginative	  success	  in	  this	  case,	  but	  it	  is	  limited.	  A	  how-­‐possibly	  mechanism	  is	  imagined	  which	  can	  direct	  research	  forward	  by	  identifying	  targets	  of	  inquiry.	  However	  it	  fails	  to	  integrate	  all	  known	  data,	  and	  thus	  it	  is	  known	  in	  advance	  that	  the	  hypothesis	  is	  incomplete	  and	  selective,	  and	  that	  it	  likely	  will	  not	  provide	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  whole	  mechanism.	  To	  overcome	  this	  limitation,	  panel	  B	  attempts	  to	  incorporate	  RpaA's	  role	  in	  a	  conservative	  manner.	  It	  employs	  the	  same	  conventions	  for	  depicting	  the	  KaiC	  oscillator,	  adds	  a	  schematic	  cycle	  for	  RpaA,	  and	  combines	  these	  with	  an	  iconic	  representation	  of	  oscillating	  gene	  expression.	  The	  result,	  however,	  is	  unduly	  cognitively	  taxing,	  in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  bifurcated	  use	  of	  space	  on	  the	  page.	  This	  is	  another	  example	  of	  a	  (partial)	  imaginative	  failure:	  both	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  S-­‐phosphoform	  for	  KaiC	  oscillator	  output,	  and	  the	  influence	  of	  RpaA,	  are	  successfully	  shown,	  but	  the	  authors	  regard	  the	  graphic	  as	  leaving	  unwanted	  free	  variability:	  it	  still	  does	  not	  sufficiently	  incorporate	  constraints	  about	  the	  precise	  effects	  of	  RpaA	  in	  modulating	  the	  expression	  of	  Class	  I	  and	  Class	  II	  promoters. 
 Panel	  C	  abandons	  the	  standard	  representation	  of	  the	  KaiC	  oscillator,	  reducing	  it	  to	  a	  schematic	  cycle,	  and	  in	  this	  way	  foregrounds	  the	  relative	  contributions	  of	  KaiC	  and	  RpaA	  to	  output.	  Yet	  the	  entire	  graphic	  must	  be	  duplicated	  in	  order	  to	  make	  clear	  the	  differential	  effects	  of	  KaiC	  and	  RpaA	  on	  both	  Class	  1	  promoters	  (top)	  and	  Class	  2	  promoters	  (bottom).	  It	  is	  just	  this	  kind	  of	  creative	  deployment	  of	  visual	  representations	  that	  often	  serves	  as	  a	  prerequisite	  in	  putting	  forth	  any	  clear	  mechanistic	  hypothesis,	  and	  it	  helps	  to	  illustrate	  the	  utility	  of	  external	  representations	  in	  pursuing	  imaginative	  success.	  One	  would	  be	  hard-­‐pressed	  to	  keep	  a	  private	  “image	  in	  the	  mind's	  eye”	  of	  both	  of	  the	  two	  images	  shown	  in	  panel	  C,	  or	  to	  alternate	  between	  imagining	  each	  of	  them,	  hoping	  to	  compare	  them.	  Utilizing	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space-­‐on-­‐the-­‐page	  and	  outsourcing	  these	  representations,	  one	  attains	  a	  visualization	  that	  is	  sufficient	  to	  incorporate	  all	  relevant	  constraints	  and	  to	  advance	  a	  clear	  hypothesis.	  	  	  
4.	  Imagining	  Mechanisms	  in	  Operation	  	  Although	  the	  mechanisms	  represented	  in	  the	  figures	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  are	  dynamic,	  the	  diagrams	  are	  static.	  To	  understand	  how	  the	  operations	  portrayed	  can	  result	  in	  the	  generation	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  circadian	  rhythms,	  sustained	  oscillation),	  the	  viewer	  must	  imagine	  the	  execution	  of	  the	  operations	  shown	  in	  the	  diagrams.	  Sometimes	  this	  can	  be	  done	  by	  mentally	  animating	  the	  diagram,	  visualizing	  each	  operation	  and	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  changes	  in	  which	  it	  results.	  Using	  a	  task	  in	  which	  participants	  were	  required	  to	  determine	  the	  effect	  of	  pulling	  a	  rope	  on	  parts	  of	  a	  pulley	  system	  (Figure	  5)	  while	  reaction	  times	  and	  errors	  were	  measured	  and	  eye	  movements	  tracked,	  Hegarty	  (1992;	  see	  Schwartz	  &	  Black,	  1999,	  for	  related	  results)	  demonstrated	  that	  people	  sequentially	  animate	  individual	  parts	  of	  the	  pulley	  system	  in	  causal	  order.	  Although	  the	  operations	  in	  the	  mechanism	  diagrams	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  (synthesizing	  proteins	  or	  binding	  phosphates)	  are	  less	  readily	  imagined	  visually,	  when	  the	  diagram	  is	  simple	  enough	  those	  expert	  in	  the	  types	  of	  operations	  proposed	  are	  often	  able	  to	  rehearse	  mentally	  the	  effects	  of	  these	  operations	  to	  determine	  how	  the	  mechanism	  generates	  the	  phenomenon.	  	  Still,	  it	  is	  rare	  for	  a	  diagram	  to	  explicitly	  encode	  all	  the	  background	  knowledge	  (e.g.,	  regarding	  the	  relative	  phasing	  of	  different	  activities)	  that	  is	  required. 
	  Figure	  5.	  Pulley	  systems	  used	  in	  Hegarty’s	  (1992)	  experiments	  	  Mental	  animation	  works	  reasonably	  well	  when	  the	  operations	  occur	  sequentially	  so	  that	  one	  does	  not	  have	  to	  try	  to	  keep	  track	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  multiple	  operations	  at	  the	  same	  time	  and	  when	  the	  operations	  can	  be	  described	  in	  linear	  equations.	  But	  when	  multiple	  operations	  are	  viewed	  as	  interacting	  with	  each	  other	  at	  the	  same	  time	  in	  a	  non-­‐linear	  fashion,	  as	  in	  the	  diagrams	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  mental	  animation	  ceases	  to	  provide	  a	  reliable	  indication	  of	  the	  mechanism’s	  behavior.	  Instead,	  researchers	  often	  appeal	  to	  computational	  models	  to	  determine	  how	  (and	  when)	  the	  mechanism's	  parts	  will	  behave.	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  For	  example,	  the	  mechanism	  Rust	  et	  al.	  imagined	  in	  Figure	  3C	  involves	  the	  continuous	  transformation	  between	  the	  four	  phosphoforms	  shown	  around	  the	  perimeter.	  These	  transformations	  are	  modulated	  by	  the	  effects	  of	  KaiA	  and	  KaiB,	  which	  are	  assumed	  to	  affect	  the	  rates	  in	  a	  non-­‐linear	  fashion.	  This	  far	  exceeds	  the	  ability	  of	  humans	  to	  animate	  mentally.	  Accordingly	  Rust	  et	  al.	  developed	  a	  computational	  model	  in	  which	  three	  equations	  specified	  how	  concentrations	  of	  the	  T,	  S,	  and	  doubly-­‐phosphorylated	  (“ST”)	  phosphoforms	  would	  change	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  operations	  represented	  by	  the	  arrows	  connecting	  them	  to	  other	  phosphoforms.	  Each	  term	  relating	  two	  phosphoforms	  includes	  a	  rate	  parameter	  kXY,	  which	  itself	  changes	  according	  to	  the	  following	  formula 	  where	   	  is	  the	  rate	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  KaiA,	   is	  the	  maximal	  influence	  of	  KaiA	  on	  the	  rate,	  and	  A	  is	  the	  concentration	  of	  active	  KaiA.	  The	  resulting	  equations	  were	  differentially	  integrated,	  resulting	  in	  a	  pattern	  of	  oscillation	  for	  each	  phosphoform.	  To	  understand	  these	  modeled	  data,	  the	  researchers	  visualized	  them	  in	  an	  abstract,	  quantitative	  space	  (Figure	  6B)	  and	  compared	  them	  to	  a	  similar	  visualization	  of	  actual	  experimental	  data	  from	  a	  cyanobacterium	  (Figure	  6A).	   
	  Figure	  6.	  Comparison	  of	  empirical	  data	  and	  results	  of	  a	  simulation	  using	  the	  computational	  model	  Rust	  et	  al.	  developed	  based	  on	  the	  mechanism	  shown	  in	  Figure	  3C.	  	  In	  this	  instance,	  the	  computational	  simulation	  served	  as	  a	  means	  of	  extending	  the	  ability	  of	  humans	  to	  imagine	  the	  operation	  of	  a	  mechanism.	  As	  discussed	  in	  section	  3	  above,	  the	  basic	  structure	  and	  functional	  arrangement	  of	  the	  mechanism	  Rust	  et	  al.	  proposed	  was	  well-­‐supported	  by	  experimental	  data.	  But	  they	  also	  needed	  to	  support	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  
dynamics	  of	  such	  a	  system	  could	  produce	  the	  target	  phenomenon	  of	  circadian	  rhythmicity.	  It	  was	  to	  accomplish	  this	  that	  the	  authors	  turned	  to	  a	  computational	  simulation.	  But	  the	  raw	  output	  of	  the	  simulation	  is	  a	  set	  of	  numbers:	  the	  values	  assigned	  to	  variables	  at	  continuous	  time-­‐points.	  To	  make	  sense	  of	  these	  numbers,	  the	  researchers	  graphed	  them	  over	  time	  just	  as	  they	  did	  the	  data	  from	  actual	  experiments.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  graph	  closely	  resembles	  that	  of	  the	  actual	  data	  supports	  the	  contention	  that	  the	  imagined	  mechanism	  could	  account	  for	  the	  phenomenon—it	  provides	  the	  epistemic	  grip	  needed	  to	  convincingly	  put	  forth	  a	  how-­‐possibly	  mechanism.	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  In	  this	  case,	  there	  is	  a	  relatively	  close	  connection	  between	  the	  variables	  deployed	  in	  the	  model	  and	  biologically	  realistic	  parts	  and	  activities.	  It	  might	  seem	  that	  this	  suffices	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  mechanism	  works.	  But	  surprisingly,	  given	  the	  intuitive	  idea	  that	  completeness	  is	  a	  virtue	  in	  mechanistic	  explanations	  (Kaplan	  &	  Craver,	  2011),	  researchers	  often	  take	  a	  different	  approach	  to	  understanding	  why	  the	  mechanism	  behaves	  as	  the	  simulation	  shows	  that	  it	  does.	  To	  this	  end,	  researchers	  find	  it	  useful	  to	  abstract	  from	  actual	  components	  and	  search	  for	  general	  design	  principles	  (Levy	  &	  Bechtel,	  2013;	  Green,	  Levy,	  &	  Bechtel,	  2014).	  Jolley,	  Ode,	  and	  Ueda	  (2012)	  illustrate	  such	  a	  strategy	  for	  imagining	  a	  mechanism	  of	  rhythmicity	  that	  aims	  not	  to	  track	  its	  actual	  parts	  and	  operations	  in	  full	  specificity,	  but	  rather	  to	  reveal	  the	  key	  design	  principles	  behind	  its	  operation.	   
 They	  began	  by	  imagining	  the	  skeleton	  mechanism	  shown	  in	  Figure	  7A.	  The	  basic	  functional	  arrangement	  here	  ought	  to	  be	  familiar	  from	  our	  previous	  discussion	  of	  the	  KaiC	  oscillator.	  What	  is	  being	  modeled	  is	  a	  simple	  posttranslational	  oscillator	  that	  relies	  upon	  a	  single	  substrate	  (labeled	  “S”)	  that	  can	  be	  phosphorylated	  (“P”)	  at	  two	  different	  sites	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  one	  of	  two	  enzymes,	  a	  phosphatase	  (the	  blue	  oval	  in	  panels	  B	  and	  C)	  and	  a	  kinase	  (the	  green	  oval	  in	  panels	  B	  and	  C).	  While	  this	  closely	  resembles	  Figure	  4B,	  they	  have	  annotated	  each	  arrow	  with	  two	  parameters	  (k1.	  .	  .	  k8	  are	  rate	  parameters	  specifying	  the	  number	  of	  substrate	  molecules	  converted	  to	  product	  molecules	  in	  a	  given	  reaction	  per	  enzyme	  per	  minute	  and	  Km1.	  .	  .	  Km8	  are	  binding	  parameters	  that	  determine	  the	  substrate	  concentrations	  at	  which	  each	  reaction	  reaches	  half	  its	  maximum	  rate).	  After	  generating	  the	  appropriate	  equations,	  Jolley	  et	  al.	  used	  numerical	  simulation	  to	  discover	  which	  sets	  of	  parameter	  values	  would	  sustain	  oscillations	  with	  the	  hope	  that	  they	  could	  identify	  a	  systematic	  pattern	  among	  the	  successful	  parameter	  values.	  	  	  
	  Figure	  7.	  A.	  Simplified	  model	  of	  the	  oscillator	  used	  by	  Jolley	  et	  al.	  showing	  the	  16	  parameters	  whose	  values	  they	  investigated.	  B.	  A	  schematic	  representation	  of	  the	  two	  clusters	  of	  parameter	  values	  Jolley	  et	  al.	  identified	  that	  generated	  sustained	  oscillations.	  Thickness	  of	  the	  arrows	  around	  the	  perimeter	  indicates	  relative	  magnitude	  (speed)	  of	  the	  parameter-­‐values	  that	  produced	  sustain	  oscillations.	  The	  flat-­‐ended	  arrows	  in	  the	  center	  of	  these	  panels	  are	  explained	  in	  the	  text.	  	  Even	  directing	  their	  search	  to	  those	  sets	  of	  parameter	  values	  they	  thought	  likely	  to	  produce	  oscillations,	  Jolley	  et	  al.	  found	  that	  only	  ~0.1%	  of	  the	  sets	  of	  parameter	  values	  they	  checked	  generated	  sustained	  oscillations.	  This	  low	  “hit	  rate”	  indicates	  that	  their	  model	  was	  not	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overly	  permissive	  in	  generating	  oscillations.	  By	  randomly	  generating	  over	  a	  billion	  sets	  of	  parameter	  values,	  they	  identified	  approximately	  one	  million	  ”hits”	  that	  did	  generate	  sustained	  oscillations	  and	  then	  employed	  a	  clustering	  algorithm	  to	  determine	  if	  there	  were	  any	  common	  patterns	  among	  the	  hits.	  They	  found	  two	  major	  clusters	  that	  accounted	  for	  70%	  of	  the	  hits	  and	  that	  most	  of	  the	  remaining	  hits	  were	  very	  similar	  to	  those	  in	  the	  clusters.	  Abstracting	  from	  specific	  values	  and	  using	  thickness	  of	  arrows	  to	  indicate	  the	  speed	  of	  reactions	  determined	  by	  the	  rate	  parameter,	  Figure	  7B	  shows	  that	  both	  clusters	  employ	  a	  motif	  in	  which	  the	  rates	  in	  the	  clockwise	  direction	  are	  higher	  than	  in	  the	  reverse	  direction.	  They	  also	  exhibit	  a	  motif	  of	  having	  low	  binding	  parameters	  for	  two	  of	  the	  reactions,	  which	  result	  in	  much	  of	  the	  enzyme	  being	  tied	  up	  in	  one	  of	  the	  reactions	  and	  thus	  unavailable	  to	  catalyze	  other	  reactions	  until	  it	  is	  liberated.	  The	  authors	  refer	  to	  this	  as	  “enzyme	  sequestering,”	  which	  they	  represent	  by	  flat-­‐ended	  arrows	  from	  one	  phosphorylation	  step	  to	  a	  subsequent	  arrow	  symbolizing	  a	  reaction	  that	  will	  be	  slowed	  by	  the	  unavailability	  of	  the	  enzyme.	  	  The	  researchers	  supported	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  these	  two	  motifs	  are	  what	  generate	  the	  oscillations	  in	  the	  model	  by	  creating	  new	  parameter	  sets	  which	  conformed	  to	  these	  motifs:	  the	  result	  was	  a	  much	  higher	  “hit	  rate”	  for	  producing	  sustained	  oscillations	  in	  models	  that	  fit	  the	  motifs.	  	  The	  free	  variability	  permitted	  here	  is	  extensive.	  While	  the	  KaiC	  oscillator	  was	  the	  first	  posttranslational	  oscillator	  discovered,	  it	  is	  now	  widely	  believed	  that	  many	  organisms,	  including	  animals,	  have	  a	  circadian	  clock	  that	  includes	  posttranslational	  oscillators	  in	  addition	  to	  central	  TTFLs.	  There	  are	  other	  oscillators	  that	  are	  not	  circadian	  but	  also	  involve	  phosphorylation	  and	  dephosphorylation.	  Jolley	  et	  al.'s	  model	  is	  potentially	  applicable	  to	  a	  huge	  number	  of	  these	  cases.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  not	  known	  how	  many	  such	  posttranslational	  oscillators	  limit	  themselves	  to	  the	  simple	  model	  here,	  and	  how	  many	  might	  involve	  further	  parts	  and	  activities.	  Insofar	  as	  the	  model	  is	  offered	  as	  a	  general	  model	  of	  oscillators	  –	  it	  is	  supposed	  that	  this	  model	  may	  fit	  all	  cases,	  until	  it	  is	  shown	  otherwise	  –	  	  the	  model	  is	  fictive.5	  Meanwhile,	  the	  authors'	  decision	  to	  encode	  the	  speed	  of	  reactions	  using	  the	  thickness	  of	  arrows	  in	  panels	  B	  and	  C	  is	  a	  creative	  choice	  which	  facilitates	  easy	  comprehension	  of	  how	  the	  schematic	  model	  depicted	  in	  panel	  A	  must	  have	  its	  parameter	  values	  fixed	  if	  oscillations	  are	  to	  be	  attained.	  One	  way	  to	  understand	  the	  distinctive	  value	  of	  the	  imaginative	  practice	  shown	  here,	  in	  contrast	  to	  those	  discussed	  above,	  is	  that	  Jolley	  et	  al.	  are	  attempting	  to	  clarify	  the	  decisive	  constraints	  that	  any	  post-­‐translational	  oscillator	  must	  satisfy.	  The	  graphic	  attains	  imaginative	  success	  in	  putting	  forth	  an	  hypothesis	  regarding	  near-­‐universal	  features	  of	  any	  such	  oscillator:	  this	  hypothesis	  then	  recommends	  certain	  standards	  for	  assessing	  imaginative	  success	  elsewhere,	  laying	  down	  general	  constraints	  which	  (if	  the	  hypothesis	  is	  a	  good	  one)	  any	  future	  bout	  of	  imaginative	  reasoning	  (i.e.,	  any	  future	  positing	  of	  a	  hypothetical	  mechanism)	  must	  satisfy	  to	  attain	  success.	  	  In	  Figure	  7	  above,	  the	  structure	  and	  operations	  of	  the	  modeled	  system	  are	  foregrounded.	  Some	  temporal	  information	  (about	  rates	  of	  reactions)	  is	  included,	  but	  it	  remains	  difficult	  to	  mentally	  animate	  this	  graphic	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  whole	  system	  will	  behave	  over	  time.	  	  Rust	  et	  al.'s	  strategy	  for	  addressing	  this,	  seen	  in	  in	  Figure	  5,	  was	  to	  employ	  an	  abstract	  
                                                            5 Offering the model is thus a step in the dynamic practice of heuristic category-negotiation (Sheredos 2015). 
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space	  in	  which	  one	  dimension	  of	  the	  page	  represents	  time,	  and	  the	  other	  represents	  a	  quantitative	  value	  (abundance	  of	  each	  KaiC	  phosphoform).	  An	  alternative	  strategy	  is	  to	  employ	  an	  abstract	  “state-­‐space”	  in	  which	  every	  dimension	  defines	  the	  range	  of	  values	  on	  a	  variable,	  and	  then	  plot	  the	  state	  of	  the	  system	  at	  successive	  instants	  of	  time	  as	  a	  trajectory	  through	  that	  abstract	  space.	  Jolley	  et	  al.	  plotted	  successive	  states	  of	  their	  imagined	  system	  in	  a	  space	  defined	  by	  two	  variables,	  S00	  and	  S10.	  Three	  trajectories	  of	  the	  mechanism	  are	  shown	  in	  the	  blue,	  green,	  and	  red	  lines,	  with	  arrowheads	  showing	  the	  direction	  of	  successive	  values.	  By	  following	  many	  such	  trajectories,	  researchers	  can	  identify	  abstract	  patterns	  of	  a	  complex	  system's	  dynamics,	  since	  they	  are	  imagined	  as	  visual	  patterns	  in	  that	  space.	  For	  example,	  all	  three	  trajectories	  shown	  in	  Figure	  8	  asymptote	  on	  the	  black	  closed	  form	  known	  as	  a	  limit	  cycle.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  form	  is	  closed	  indicates	  that	  as	  the	  system	  approximates	  the	  represented	  values,	  it	  will	  continue	  to	  cycle	  through	  the	  sequence	  of	  values	  indefinitely—that	  is,	  it	  exhibits	  sustained	  oscillations.	  By	  constructing	  this	  abstract	  space,	  an	  exceedingly	  complex	  dynamic	  pattern	  in	  a	  system's	  operations	  can	  be	  creatively	  displayed	  using	  a	  simple	  loop.	  While	  this	  graphic	  does	  not	  provide	  precise	  temporal	  information	  (e.g.,	  it	  does	  not	  make	  clear	  how	  much	  time	  it	  takes	  for	  the	  system	  to	  move	  from	  one	  point	  on	  the	  trajectory	  to	  another),	  it	  can	  be	  used	  to	  provide	  general	  information	  about	  the	  system's	  dynamics.	  Further	  information	  (which	  they	  present	  in	  other	  figures)	  is	  required	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  oscillations	  are	  circadian	  in	  their	  time	  course,	  with	  one	  oscillation	  occurring	  roughly	  every	  24	  hours.	  	  
	  Figure	  8.	  Jolley	  et	  al.’s	  phase	  space	  plot	  showing	  how	  the	  functioning	  of	  their	  imagined	  oscillator	  results	  in	  a	  limit	  cycle.	  	  	  As	  before,	  this	  extremely	  abstract	  representation	  puts	  forth	  a	  hypothesis	  which	  can	  be	  taken	  to	  impose	  constraints	  upon	  any	  future	  imaginative	  success.	  The	  amount	  of	  background	  knowledge	  involved	  in	  understanding	  these	  constraints,	  and	  the	  difficulty	  of	  invoking	  them	  “in	  the	  mind's	  eye”	  illustrate	  again	  the	  utility	  of	  scientists'	  reliance	  on	  external	  visualizations	  in	  attaining	  imaginative	  success.	  	  
5.	  Conclusions:	  How-­‐Possibly	  Mechanisms	  as	  Imaginative	  Successes	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We	  have	  examined	  the	  epistemic	  activities	  through	  which	  scientists	  construct	  how-­‐possibly	  accounts	  of	  mechanisms,	  that	  is,	  accounts	  of	  possible	  mechanisms	  that	  could	  explain	  a	  phenomenon	  of	  interest.	  Although	  how-­‐possibly	  accounts	  have	  often	  been	  valued	  only	  as	  means	  to	  attain	  	  how-­‐actually	  accounts,	  they	  represent	  important	  successes	  in	  science.	  Even	  in	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  account	  turns	  out	  to	  correspond	  to	  what	  is	  actual,	  the	  how-­‐possibly	  account	  plays	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  showing	  that	  that	  mechanism	  could	  produce	  the	  phenomenon.	  Our	  interest	  has	  been	  in	  understanding	  the	  epistemic	  success	  of	  providing	  a	  how-­‐possibly	  account.	  	  The	  epistemic	  activities	  which	  go	  into	  providing	  how-­‐possibly	  accounts	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  involving	  imagination,	  characterized	  in	  terms	  of	  involving	  visualization,	  creatively	  going	  beyond	  the	  evidence,	  being	  fictive	  by	  not	  entailing	  a	  commitment	  to	  actuality,	  and	  allowing	  for	  constrained	  flexibility	  in	  generating	  a	  mechanism	  design.	  We	  have	  regarded	  diagrams	  	  as	  the	  external	  traces	  of	  scientists'	  imaginative	  reasoning,	  enabling	  us	  to	  examine	  how	  their	  imaginative	  reasoning	  proceeds.	  We	  have	  suggested	  that	  it	  is	  fruitful	  to	  regard	  the	  construction	  of	  an	  account	  of	  a	  how-­‐possibly	  mechanism	  as	  an	  imaginative	  success,	  where	  the	  success	  consists	  in	  advancing	  a	  scientific	  field	  by	  integrating	  data	  to	  provide	  an	  intelligible	  explanation	  of	  the	  phenomenon.	  This	  is	  an	  achievement	  which	  must	  be	  understood	  independently	  of	  (and	  is	  in	  fact	  presupposed	  by)	  the	  kind	  of	  success	  which	  would	  be	  achieved	  by	  a	  how-­‐actually	  account,	  and	  which	  would	  herald	  the	  completion	  of	  research	  regarding	  a	  phenomenon.	  	  	  To	  provide	  this	  account,	  we	  have	  relied	  on	  diagrams	  as	  the	  traces	  of	  imaginative	  reasoning.	  Diagrams	  figure	  prominently	  in	  scientists’	  construction	  and	  presentation	  of	  how-­‐possibly	  accounts	  of	  mechanisms.	  We	  examined	  a	  variety	  of	  published	  diagrams	  as	  well	  as	  drafts	  generated	  before	  publication	  from	  research	  on	  circadian	  rhythms	  in	  cyanobacteria.	  Diagrams	  clearly	  involve	  visualization,	  are	  fictive	  in	  that	  they	  do	  not	  themselves	  assert	  that	  the	  proposed	  mechanism	  is	  actual,	  involve	  creativity	  in	  putting	  together	  the	  components	  of	  a	  mechanism	  in	  a	  way	  that	  could	  produce	  the	  phenomenon,	  and	  exhibit	  constrained	  free	  variability,	  often	  signaled	  by	  the	  role	  of	  question	  marks	  in	  a	  diagram.	  Since	  they	  are	  supported	  by	  data,	  diagrams	  are	  not	  entirely	  fictive,	  but	  instead	  operate	  under	  constraints.	  By	  comparing	  successful	  diagrams	  we	  showed	  how	  further	  research	  both	  restricts	  the	  free	  variability	  and	  opens	  up	  new	  avenues	  for	  variation.	  The	  discovery	  that	  post-­‐translational	  processes	  suffice	  for	  circadian	  rhythms	  revealed	  that	  the	  diagrams	  in	  Figures	  1	  and	  2	  were	  clearly	  fictive	  in	  that	  they	  did	  not	  correspond	  to	  the	  actual	  mechanism.	  The	  diagrams	  shown	  in	  Figure	  3	  are	  also	  fictive	  in	  that	  they	  present	  competing	  accounts	  of	  how	  the	  mechanism	  might	  work,	  going	  beyond	  the	  data.	  	  It	  is	  through	  this	  interplay	  of	  fact	  and	  imagination	  that	  all	  of	  these	  authors	  achieve	  imaginative	  success,	  by	  in	  offering	  accounts	  of	  mechanisms	  that	  could	  intelligibly	  generate	  circadian	  rhythms.,	  thereby	  providing	  explicit	  targets	  for	  future	  research.	  	  	  Such	  success	  is	  not	  simple	  and	  automatic,	  as	  shown	  by	  a	  case	  in	  which	  we	  had	  access	  to	  drafts	  of	  the	  mechanism	  the	  researchers	  were	  proposing	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  circadian	  oscillator	  regulates	  gene	  expression.	  Here,	  not	  surprisingly,	  early	  drafts,	  while	  in	  part	  successful,	  also	  exhibited	  imaginative	  failure.	  The	  first	  draft	  exhibited	  the	  basic	  finding	  of	  the	  researchers	  that	  the	  S-­‐phosphoform	  of	  KaiC	  drives	  gene	  expression,	  but	  did	  not	  show	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how	  it	  interacted	  with	  another,	  already	  established	  pathway.	  We	  presented	  one	  of	  many	  drafts	  that	  the	  researchers	  constructed	  in	  the	  process	  of	  exploring	  how	  the	  two	  pathways	  interacted.	  While	  these	  did	  include	  both	  pathways,	  and	  in	  that	  sense	  were	  more	  successful,	  the	  attempt	  to	  incorporate	  detail	  about	  the	  interaction	  led	  these	  to	  become	  increasingly	  complicated.	  Finally,	  the	  researchers	  chose	  to	  simplify	  the	  diagram	  by	  leaving	  out	  details	  not	  pertinent	  to	  the	  question	  of	  the	  interaction	  of	  the	  two	  pathways	  and	  constructed	  separate	  diagrams	  for	  the	  two	  classes	  of	  gene	  promoters	  involved.	  This	  proved	  far	  more	  successful	  and	  led	  to	  the	  diagram	  they	  published.	  The	  unpublished	  record	  gives	  an	  indication	  of	  the	  value	  that	  scientists	  assign	  to	  imaginative	  success,	  and	  the	  difficulties	  they	  often	  face	  –	  and	  work	  to	  overcome	  –	  in	  attaining	  it.	  	  Unique	  difficulties	  are	  involved	  in	  imagining	  a	  possible	  mechanism's	  operations	  over	  time.	  With	  relatively	  simple	  mechanisms	  that	  are	  organized	  sequentially	  and	  do	  not	  involve	  significant	  non-­‐linearities,	  people	  can	  successfully	  imagine	  them	  in	  operation	  and	  draw	  conclusions	  about	  how	  the	  proposed	  mechanism	  would	  behave.	  But	  many	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  being	  proposed	  in	  contemporary	  biology,	  such	  as	  those	  involving	  the	  cyanobacterial	  circadian	  clock,	  are	  not	  sequentially	  organized	  (employing	  sometimes	  multiple	  feedback	  loops)	  and	  involve	  non-­‐linear	  reactions.	  We	  showed	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  one	  of	  the	  accounts	  of	  a	  possible	  mechanisms	  considered	  earlier,	  the	  researchers	  turned	  to	  computational	  modeling	  to	  determine	  how	  their	  proposed	  mechanisms	  would	  behave,	  This	  activity	  itself	  was	  grounded	  in	  the	  diagram	  in	  which	  they	  had	  imagined	  the	  mechanism.	  We	  finished	  with	  a	  case	  in	  which,	  in	  the	  effort	  to	  understand	  the	  basic	  principles	  operative	  in	  a	  proposed	  mechanism,	  researchers	  abstracted	  from	  details	  of	  the	  mechanism	  and	  explored	  through	  a	  computational	  model	  what	  parameter	  values	  were	  required	  to	  yield	  the	  phenomenon.	  In	  both	  these	  cases,	  the	  researchers	  represented	  the	  results	  of	  their	  modeling	  in	  graph	  representations	  that	  enabled	  them	  to	  present	  the	  results	  of	  the	  simulation	  of	  the	  imagined	  mechanism.	  These	  cases	  illustrate	  again	  how	  diagrams	  are	  employed	  to	  facilitate	  imaginative	  success.	  We	  conclude	  that	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  epistemic	  project	  when	  scientists	  develop	  mechanistic	  explanations	  is	  imagining	  possible	  mechanisms	  by	  representing	  the	  parts,	  operations,	  and	  organization	  of	  the	  mechanism	  in	  diagrams	  and	  then	  putting	  those	  diagrams	  to	  work	  in	  further	  imagining	  (often	  using	  computational	  simulations)	  how	  those	  mechanisms	  will	  operate.	  Putting	  components	  together	  and	  showing	  that	  the	  possible	  mechanism	  could	  generate	  the	  phenomenon	  are	  important	  imaginative	  successes	  in	  the	  development	  of	  intelligible	  mechanistic	  explanations,	  and	  visualizing	  computational	  models	  is	  a	  crucial	  component	  of	  this	  success.	  Notably,	  imaginative	  success	  serves	  to	  generate	  norms—as	  researchers	  develop	  diagrams	  and	  computational	  models	  that	  they	  regard	  as	  establishing	  requirements	  on	  mechanisms	  that	  can	  account	  for	  a	  phenomenon,	  they	  lay	  down	  basic	  constraints	  which	  must	  be	  satisfied	  by	  any	  future	  imagining	  of	  this	  type	  of	  mechanism.	  In	  this	  respect,	  norms	  of	  imaginative	  success	  exhibit	  a	  kind	  of	  self-­‐regulation,	  which	  we	  are	  unlikely	  to	  understand	  until	  we	  treat	  imaginative	  success	  on	  its	  own	  terms,	  disentangling	  it	  from	  the	  norms	  that	  govern	  successful	  attainment	  of	  a	  “how-­‐actually”	  explanation.	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